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Implications of the Eurozone Crisis for Monetary Unions in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Andy (A.W.) Mullineux 
 
Abstract 
This paper draws implications from the 2010-2012 ‘Eurozone Crisis’ for currency and 
proposed monetary unions in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  A wide variety of currency 
and monetary unions exist, or are proposed, including ‘currency boards’. Most involve 
a potential mix of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ countries without the prospect of prompt 
major trade gains.  Most also mix net commodity exporters with net importers subject 
to asymmetric commodity price shocks.  The experience of the Eurozone, with its well 
defined post crisis core and periphery countries, suggests that greater convergence and 
political and institutional preparation is required before a successful and fully fledged 
monetary union can be established. 
 
Keyword:  African monetary unions, Eurozone crisis, bank bad debt problems, 
fiscal consolidation 
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1. Introduction 
The ‘Eurozone’ is a ‘common currency area’ which has been formed by a group of 
countries (17 of the 27 European Union member countries).   It is part of a wider 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) which has the European Central Bank (ECB) 
at the centre of a central banking system involving the national central banks of the 
Eurozone member country and the other EU member countries.  Countries outside the 
Eurozone, such as the UK and Sweden, have their own currencies and central banks, 
the Bank of England in the UK, and the Rijksbank in Sweden, and which set their own 
interest rates; but the 17 countries using the euro, and also a number of other EU 
member countries that essentially ‘peg’ their currencies to the euro, effectively have 
their interest rates set by the ECB.  As members of a common currency area, the 
Eurozone members cannot alter their exchange rate with other member countries.  
Meanwhile, the EU countries outside the Eurozone have the option to allow their 
currencies to depreciate relative to the euro in order to improve their competitiveness 
in international trade.  The exchange rate of the euro can, however, fluctuate against 
the US dollar and many other currencies. 
The drive to form a monetary, union started with the 1992 ‘Maastricht Treaty’.  In 
January 1999 the founding members of the Eurozone (the nine signatories of the 
Maastricht Treaty excluding the UK and Denmark, which gained exemption adopted 
the euro for trading and accounting purposes.  In January 2001 the euro was adopted 
as a means of payment; with euro notes and coins replacing domestic currencies (e.g. 
the French franc and the German Deutschmark) in the participating countries.  On 1st 
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January 2001, Greece, which joined the EU in 198, also became a member of the 
Eurozone and other countries (e.g. Malta, Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia) 
have also subsequently joined; whilst Latvia, Lithuania (with a fluctuation band of 
15%) and Denmark (with a fluctuation band of 2.25%) are currently in the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (‘ERM 2’), and thus shadowing the euro’s central rate and waiting in 
the wings to join the Eurozone. The other Central and Southern EU member states, 
including the largest, Poland, are required to join ERM 2 for a defined period prior to 
joining the Eurozone. 
Five ‘convergence conditions’ for aspiring members of the Eurozone were agreed by 
the EU governments: fiscal deficits less than 3% of GDP; national debt no more than 
60% of GDP; inflation rate no more than 1.5% higher than the average of the best 
performing EU member states; long term interest rates no more than 2% higher than 
the average in the three member states with the lowest inflation; and membership of 
the exchange rate mechanism (‘ERM II’) agreed under the European Monetary 
System (EMS) for at least two continuous years without devaluing their currencies.  
Under the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ (SGP) between Eurozone members, 
participating countries were expected to continue to meet the fiscal deficit and 
national debt conditions, but no fiscal harmonisation involving common tax levels 
was required and no European Finance Ministry was to be established. 
It has become clear that Greece was admitted to the Eurozone having massaged its 
national economic statistics in order to meet the convergence conditions for 
membership.  Goldman Sachs, the Wall Street investment bank, had devised financial 
derivatives to move deficits and debt into the future, so that prevailing current levels 
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appeared to qualify.  It is less clear whether the existing members were really unaware 
of this. Whilst Greece was being admitted to the Eurozone, Germany, which was 
struggling to meet the fiscal deficit requirements of the SGP as it incurred the costs of 
re-unifying East and West Germany in the 1990s, and also France flouted the fiscal 
rules. Hence, the two largest members undermined the pact, whilst the third largest, 
Italy, had been heavily indebted from the outset. 
The formation of the ‘German Monetary Union’ (GMU) following the replacement of 
the East German mark (the Öestmark) with the Deutschmark used in West Germany 
was followed by substantial fiscal transfers from West Germany to East Germany, 
funded by a ‘solidarity tax’ in West Germany; in order to help re-structure the East 
German economy more rapidly and to alleviate its ‘transition recession’ (Murinde and 
Mullineux, 1999).  The fiscal union that was required to underpin a GMU and 
monetary unions in countries like the United States of America (the ‘US’) and the 
Australian Commonwealth of States (‘Australia’), was absent in the Eurozone.  The 
US and Australia combine a currency union with fiscal transfers from surplus states to 
deficit states (Western Australian Treasury, 1999).  For the Eurozone to become such 
a ‘transfer union’, a ‘solidarity tax’ would have to be levied on surplus countries, such 
as Germany, to assist adjustment in deficit states, such as Greece at the present time. 
The European political elite seemingly hoped that participation in a common currency 
area would accelerate economic and political convergence, leading eventually to the 
fiscal and political union amongst participating countries necessary to underpin a full 
monetary union.  The EU government bond markets seemed to ‘buy’ the idea that the 
adoption of the euro and participation in the Eurozone common currency area was 
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irreversible, and consequently the risk premium on all participating countries declined 
and  their government bond rates converged on the rate of the most credit worthy 
member country, Germany. 
Germany’s credit worthiness was boosted following the successful implementation of 
the structural reform of its labour market in response to the ‘Hartz laws’ and a series 
of restrained annual national wage bargains in the mid-2000s; which increased 
Germany’s productivity and competitiveness within the Eurozone, and internationally.  
As a result, that Germany began to re-build its trade surplus on the back of a strong 
manufacturing export performance, both within the EU and globally. 
Germany had undertaken an ‘internal devaluation’, something which Estonia also 
subsequently achieved in the late 2000s, after joining the Eurozone in June 2004.  An 
internal devaluation requires a country to reduce wages relative to other member states 
and/or to raise productivity (output per hour worked).  This requires wage increases to 
be repressed for a period and perhaps even cut, as seemed required in Greece, and is 
often associated with a recession with declining or negative wage inflation.  A 
currency depreciation, or devaluation, is easier because it automatically reduces the 
‘real’ wages of all workers relative to other countries, unless they devalue 
competitively.  However, if wage inflation subsequently accelerates as workers 
attempt to restore their purchasing power in the face of higher import prices, the 
benefits are eroded (Sargan, 1964).  The faster and further wages rise, the more 
quickly the competitive advantage achieved by devaluation is eroded.  Worse, the 
devaluing country may see price inflation rise and have to undertake a period of 
monetary restraint, and perhaps fiscal austerity, to bring it under control. 
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2 The Onset of the Crisis and the ‘Doom Loop’ 
The 2007-9 Global, or Great, Financial Crisis (GFC) sparked by the US subprime 
mortgage crisis left banks in many Eurozone countries (including Germany) with bad 
debts on their books (Beck, 2012)  which their national regulators failed to force them 
to write down.  Some countries, notably Ireland and Spain, generated housing price 
bubbles, as did the UK outside the Eurozone, whilst others, including Germany and 
France, did not.  In some countries, such as Greece and Portugal, fiscal balances 
deteriorated, whilst others, including Ireland and Spain, had sound fiscal balances 
prior to their household and commercial property, and consequently banking, crises.  
Italy was seemingly losing control of its fiscal deficit and France was also developing 
a growing deficit.  Meanwhile, Germany’s fiscal deficit had declined significantly. 
Greece meanwhile had a growing trade deficit with the rest of the EU and the world, 
whilst in Germany had surpluses were growing.  
In May 2010, Greece was rescued by the European Commission and the ECB with 
assistance from the IMF.  Then, in November 2010, Ireland also received financial 
assistance from the same ‘Troika’. Subsequently, in May 2011, Portugal negotiated a 
re-financing agreement with the ‘Troika’ to bring its fiscal deficit under control by 
adopting an economic reform programme.  Italy and Spain chose to design their own 
fiscal austerity and structural reform programmes without assistance, as did the UK 
outside the Eurozone.  The ‘conditionality’ imposed on the borrowing countries 
reflected the traditional IMF practice of requiring fiscal ‘consolidation’ along with 
‘structural’ economic reforms. The fiscal austerity in Greece and elsewhere was 
arguably too much too soon and countries that voluntarily adopted austerity, 
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particularly Spain, experienced economic slowdowns and sharp rises in 
unemployment.  
After the ‘bail-out’ of Greece in May 2010, the convergence of Eurozone member 
state bond interest rates gave way to divergence and the government bond interest 
rates moved above 7%, at which, with a national debt over 90%, as in Greece, and, as 
a result of bank ‘bail outs’ by the government, in Spain, the cost of servicing 
government debt arguably becomes unsustainable (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011).  
The ECB had been granting cheap medium term loans to banks under a Longer Term 
Refinancing Operation (LTRO), enabling the banks to buy government bonds if they 
choose to.  The biggest borrowers had been Spanish and Italian banks and their 
purchases of their domestic government’s bonds helped to reduce their interest rates, 
but it increased the exposure of Eurozone banks to domestic government defaults.  
Meanwhile, a significant proportion of the government debt in Spain, and indeed in 
many other countries, was the result of rescuing domestic banks.  Further, to make 
them safer, the banks were required by their regulators to increase their holdings of 
the short term government bonds and treasury bills issued by their home country 
governments, exposing them to greater risk of government default. In the most 
troubled countries, there was essentially a ‘negative feedback loop’, or ‘Doom Loop’, 
linking the debts and credit worthiness of banks and those of their governments. As in 
Ireland before it, the cost of supporting the banks in Spain, for example, was too high 
for Spain’s government to bear alone, because it would worsen the fiscal deficit, and 
this would further reduce the value of the government bonds held by the Spanish 
banks and raise the cost of Spain’s government borrowing. To break this ‘Doom 
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Loop’ in Spain it was clear by June 2012 that outside help was needed to resolve 
Spain’s banking crisis and to ease austerity and reduce unemployment by re-
stimulating growth; but would the rest of the Eurozone, and in particular, Germany, 
the largest and wealthiest country, help? 
Additionally, monetary policy within the Eurozone was ‘fragmenting’, in the sense 
that the low interest rates set by the ECB were not preventing the charging of higher 
lending rates by banks in the periphery countries, than in the ‘core’ countries. This 
was because of the cost of funding to the banks based in the periphery was higher as a 
result of the devaluation or exchange rate ‘convertibility’ risk associated with the 
probability of countries leaving, or ‘exiting’, the Eurozone; or indeed the Eurozone 
collapsing altogether and the euro being replaced by domestic currencies of uncertain 
value. The higher rates in the periphery thus reflected an exchange rate risk that 
should not be present in a fully-fledged monetary union and was distorting the 
allocation of capital and inhibiting the supply of funds to SMEs in particular, and 
consequently economic growth, in ‘the periphery’. The banks based in the ‘core’ 
countries potentially faced higher capital requirements on their more risky lending in 
the periphery and there was some evidence of ‘capital flight’  (Dickinson and 
Mullineux, 2001a,b) within the Eurozone, with deposits being moved from banks in 
the periphery to banks in the core. Further, US money market mutual funds ran down 
their wholesale funding exposures to the Eurozone in general and the periphery in 
particular.  
There was thus a growing case for supplementing traditional monetary, or interest 
rate, policy intervention in order to contain the capital flight and to reverse the 
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fragmentation, which was making it harder to achieve growth in the periphery through 
ECB induced monetary stimulus. This might be done through ECB purchases, on the 
secondary, or perhaps even the primary, markets of bonds issued by periphery 
countries’ governments, or ‘Quantitative Easing’. Such a policy, and particularly the 
purchase of primary government bond issuance, was strongly opposed by Jens 
Weidmann, the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank 
If the EU was a political union with a single Finance Ministry, as well as a central 
bank (the ECB) and as well as a ‘banking union’, then a Eurozone wide agreement to 
help any region, or state, in the union, would be all that was required.  A Eurozone 
‘banking union’ requires unified Eurozone deposit insurance and ‘resolution’ schemes 
involving banks subject to common regulation and supervision by a Eurozone bank 
regulator; in place of the national regulatory and supervisory regimes, deposit 
insurance schemes and patchy resolution regimes that were operating at the time.   
A new Fiscal Compact, signed in March 2012 by all of the EU member governments 
except the Czech Republic and the UK, requires Eurozone member countries to 
‘balance’ their government budgets (i.e. achieve a general budget deficit of less than 
3% of GDP and a structural deficit of less than 1% of GDP, if government debt is less 
than 60% of GDP, or below 0.5% of GDP, if the debt exceeds that).  If adhered to, the 
Compact might well prevent future fiscal crises.  The parallel adoption of ‘macro 
prudential’ supervision (www.bis.org) would help prevent future asset price inflations, 
including house price bubbles.  However, the political union and fiscal harmonisation 
required to underpin a full banking and monetary union remain a project for the 
future. 
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3. Escaping the ‘Doom Loop’  
In late June 2012, Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, gave ground by allowing a 
concessionary loan from the Eurozone’s forthcoming European  Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) (or its predecessor, the European Financial Stability Fund (ESFS) which was 
still in operation) directly to FROB, which did not consequently (directly) increase the 
Spanish government’s debt.  Broader proposals to form an EU-wide banking union 
and to advance fiscal and political union within the EU would take an appreciable 
amount of time to realise and many of the proposals would need to be ratified either 
by the legislatures of all EU members’ countries, or just the Eurozone participants. 
To further underpin stability, the scale of the ESM might have to be enhanced 
substantially by increasing member country contributions and allowing the ECB to 
lend to it, or by allowing the ESM to issue euro denominated bonds backed by 
member governments to fund its activities, and/or by giving it a banking licence and 
allowing it to borrow from ECB.  At the Eurozone Summit meeting in June 2012, 
Italy secured agreement that the ESFS or ESM could buy its bonds as long as it stuck 
to its austerity programme.  The ECB responded positively on July 5th to the Eurozone 
Summit initiatives by cutting interest rates and further monetary easing was promised, 
if required. 
Towards the end of July 2012, in a statement that effectively ended of the 2010-2012 
Eurozone crisis, Mario Draghi, the President of the ECB, famously announced that the 
ECB was ready to do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro”, adding: “and believe 
me, it will be enough”. The markets indeed believed him and the crisis abated with 
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government bond rates in the Eurozone again converging on lower German rates and 
by mid-2014, rates on Spain’s bonds were below rates on US bonds. 
Further, in August 2012, another ECB announcement seemed to indicate an 
accommodation between the EC and the ECB, including Jörg Asmussen, the German 
nominee on the ECB Executive Board, and the German government  The EC backed 
proposal to issue Eurozone bonds was dropped, along with the proposal to give the 
ESM a banking licence or a direct line of credit for the ECB, and there would be no 
direct purchase by the ECB of long-term government bond issuance; but the ECB 
could buy short term bonds on the secondary markets in order to reduce borrowing 
rates in periphery countries and to stabilise the euro as part of its ‘open market 
operations’ in pursuit of monetary policy.  However, Jens Weidmann, as President of 
the Bundesbank, publically expressed his disapproval.  The overall aim of these 
‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ (OMTs) was to re-establish common interest rates 
and free capital flows commensurate with a monetary union and to stem capital flight 
to the northern EU members, and from the EU altogether. 
Increased economic growth was to be pursued through increased funding for the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) to conduct infrastructural investment.  Its impact on 
growth was likely to be gradual and the source of funding was unclear given the 
difficulties expected in agreeing the next EU budget in November/December 2012. 
The ECB was apparently aiming to do just enough to alleviate the crisis whilst 
keeping pressure on European politicians to make progress with the proposed banking 
union and the fiscal and political unions necessary to facilitate the fiscal transfers and 
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debt mutualisation that is required to underpin a currency union and establish a fully 
credibly monetary union. 
Further progress was made towards establishing a banking union involving centralised 
supervision, to complement EU regulation set by the European Banking Authority 
(EBA), by the ECB under a ‘Single Supervision Mechanism’ (SSM) proposed by the 
EC in September 2012; but Germany wanted it to be effective and operational before 
the ESM could start using its €500bn fund to help with the re-capitalisation of 
troubled banks, and blocked the other components of a banking union; which would 
involve mutualisation of bank debts across countries by establishing common 
resolution and deposit insurance funds.  To protect against moral hazard, the SSM 
system should precede mutualisation and, to protect taxpayers in Germany and 
elsewhere, progress needs to be made towards political union before explicit or 
implicit fiscal transfers, along with the necessary checks and balances, can be agreed. 
It was clear that it would take time to establish a proven operationally ‘effective’ 
supervisory system at the ECB level.  The German authorities hoped that, at least 
initially, this would mean that responsibility for the supervision of local savings and 
cooperatives could remain at the national level.  
The SSM was subsequently enacted in October 2013 with the ECB assuming its 
supervisory role from 4th November 2014. In its final form the SSM reflects a 
compromise establishing a system of common bank supervision in the EU that 
involves national supervisors and the ECB, which has the final supervisory authority 
with national supervisors in a supporting role. A division of labour between the ECB 
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and national supervisors was established, with the ECB supervising ‘significant’ 
(large and cross- border) banks and national supervisors smaller domestic local banks.  
In preparation for its role the ECB is undertaking a ‘Comprehensive assessment’, to be 
completed by end October 2014, of banks in the EU comprising of: an Asset Quality 
review (AQR) of banks, including the adequacy of their collateral and provisions 
against bad and doubtful debts; and a Stress Test, which is to be performed in close 
co-operation with the European Banking Authority (EBA), which is responsible for 
bank regulation in the EU, to test the resilience of banks’ balance sheets to stress 
scenarios and thus the capital adequacy of banks. 
In April 2014, further progress towards the EC’s objective of creating a European 
Banking Union (EBU) consisting of an SSM, a Single Resolution Regime (SRM) and 
a Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) with the adoption by the European parliament of 
a bank recovery and resolution Directive (BRRD) on 15th April 2014. This is a major 
step towards and SRM and is due to become effective, following ratification by 
national legislatures, from the end of 2015. The SRM and the DGF require building 
funds financed by banks and perhaps initially also out of revenue from financial taxes, 
such as the proposed EU Financial Transactions Tax. This raises issues around the 
size of the funds, moral hazard and cross country mutualisation and will require 
further consultation and political agreement. The EC consultation on contributions of 
banks (‘credit institutions’) to the resolution financing arrangements under the BRRD 
and the SRM were launched in June 2014. In the US the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation’s deposit guarantee fund is also used for resolution of the smaller and 
local banks, it should be noted. 
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It was clear that the establishment of a full EBU will take time and require 
considerable political will and compromise.  The establishment of a political union 
with sufficiently large fiscal transfers and thus a central budget would take even 
longer; especially whilst the UK remains in the EU. 
4. The Eurozone after the crisis  
To curb fragmentation and restore the normal operation of the European money and 
capital markets, credible political steps towards banking, fiscal transfer and political 
unions needed to be taken to break out of the ‘Doom Loop’.  The formation of pooled 
Eurozone Deposit Insurance Fund (EDIF) pre-funded using risk related premiums to 
contain moral hazard, would provide the basis for mutualisation and allow transfers 
between countries.  However, it should be noted, that Germany has never adopted a 
fully funded bank deposit insurance system; preferring instead to rely on its three 
(shareholder owned, savings and cooperative) banking associations to commit to 
bailing-out troubled members, as required.  Further, the German constitutional court 
would have to approve to Germany’s participation in EDIF.  In return for access to the 
implicit transfers involved in drawing from for the fund, participating countries would 
have to give up sovereignty over domestic bank regulation. The EDIF fund could also 
manage the resolution of smaller banks and would naturally be involved in their 
regulation, as in the case of the FDIC in the US.  Given their implicit insurance by 
taxpayers, too big to fail and systemically important banks would have to be regulated 
separately, and would naturally be supervised by the ECB as their lender of last resort. 
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The purchase of Eurozone member government bond issuance by the ESM would 
require ‘conditionality’ to be imposed on borrowing governments and the associated 
loss of sovereignty.  The funding of the ESM through euro denominated bond 
issuance, implicitly guaranteed by member states, would thus be a further step towards 
fiscal and political union.  The granting of a banking licence to the ESM, or ability to 
borrow from the ECB, would reduce the need for the Eurobond issuance, however, but 
may not be approved by the German constitutional court. 
The ultimate solution would therefore entail a full  (or Eurozone wide) EBU followed 
by a full fiscal (and thus ‘transfer’) union and a political union for some or all of the 
current Eurozone member states to form a ‘United States of Europe’, and 
consequently a two or more speed Europe.   
5. Lessons 
A GdR European Money, Banking and Finance (GdRE MBF) conference panel in 
Nantes in June 2012 came to the conclusion that the way forward was for the ECB to 
do whatever was necessary to break the Doom Loop by continuing to provide ample 
liquidity to EU banks and purchasing, perhaps eventually through the ESM, 
government bonds issued by the ‘periphery’ Eurozone countries; in order to bring 
down their costs of borrowing and re-establish, as far as possible, single,  non-
fragmented, banking, monetary and capital markets within the Eurozone (Mullineux, 
2013a).  The panel recommended that Spanish banks should be re-capitalised through 
the ESM, subject to the Spanish government agreeing to a package of economic 
reforms; ideally with less emphasis on fiscal consolidation and austerity in the short 
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term and more emphasis on structural, particularly labour market, reforms.  Good 
assets and the impaired bank assets should be apportioned to separate ‘good banks’ 
and ‘bad banks’.  The management of the bad banks’ assets would naturally require 
creditors, including other banks, to take haircuts in order to reduce the exposure of 
Spanish taxpayers. The impaired assets might possibly be amalgamated into a single 
national asset management agency, such as the NAMA in Ireland.  Further, the ECB 
might eventually need to take a ‘haircut’ on the periphery government debt it is 
holding in order to fully resolve the Greek debt crisis and it appeared to have opened 
the door to this possibility in connection with the bank creditor ‘bail-in’ arrangements 
that started to be devised in early 2013. These have subsequently evolved through the 
SNS Reaal bank crisis in the Netherlands, which was nationalised on 1st February 
2013 with junior bondholders, along with shareholders, losing their investments 
completely, although senior bondholders were fully protected,  and in the 2012-13 
Cypriot banking crises which culminated in a bail-out by the Troika on terms agreed 
on 25th March 2013 which imposed losses on Laiki Bank shareholders and large 
uninsured depositors whilst protecting insured depositors up to the guarantee limit of 
100.00 euro and imposed strict capital controls to avoid capital flight 
Going forward, a banking union involving centrally coordinated banking supervision 
and ultimately a common deposit insurance fund and a common bank recovery and 
resolution fund, as in the US with its Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
would be required to underpin a fully-fledged Eurozone monetary union.  This would 
involve substantial loss of member state government control of bank supervision and 
the ‘mutualisation’ of taxpayer exposures across participating countries.  Both 
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developments are likely to prove unpopular in Germany and most of the other 
northern EU states. 
In October 2012, the European Council made use of ESM funds to re-capitalise 
Spanish banks conditional on Spain submitting to EU level supervision of their banks. 
Given the potential exposure of German taxpayers, the German government is 
pressing for fiscal and political union ahead of agreeing to participate in pooled 
deposit insurance and bank resolution funds beyond agreed ESM commitments. 
It is unclear how further progress towards a complete EBU, moving beyond the SSM 
to be implemented in November 2014 and the BRRD agreed in April 2014, can 
proceed without making further progress towards a political union amongst the 
participating states in order to agree on a system for fiscal transfers between them.  
Without it, the ECB risks progressively adopting a fiscal role through secondary 
purchases of government bonds, and perhaps eventually primary, or direct, purchases 
of member state government bond (and perhaps also Eurobond) issuance if 
Quantitative Easing is adopted, and instigating macro-prudential policies aimed at 
curbing asset price inflations. 
The export-oriented German industrial sector has clearly benefitted from membership 
of the Eurozone, but if the EBU evolves to encompass mutualisation of the costs of 
bank ‘bail outs’ without sufficient progress towards fiscal and monetary union, and if 
the viability of Germany’s popular local savings and cooperative banks is ultimately 
threatened by more centralised supervision, then the German government might weigh 
the costs and benefits of continued Eurozone participation.  It might possibly conclude 
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that a German exit from the Eurozone was in the interest of its taxpayers and the 
voting public. An alternative, northern European, monetary union (NEMU) might be 
formed! 
6)  Implications for Monetary Unions in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
 
There is a large and growing literature on currency and monetary unions in SSA.  
Tavlas (2008) presents an in depth literature review whilst assessing the prospects for 
a proposed fourteen country common currency area (the South African Development 
Community, SADC).  The review focuses on two categories of studies: those that 
assume that a country’s characteristics are invariant to the adoption of a common 
currency; and those that allow a currency union to alter economic structures through 
trade creating reductions in transaction cost and exchange rate uncertainty and 
monetary policy credibility gains.  The latter can result from a more credible 
commitment to monetary policy through greater central bank independence.  Debrun, 
Massan and Pattillo (2010) ask whether SSA monetary unions should be expanded.  
They focus on two monetary unions sharing the CFA francs issued by the West Africa 
and the Central African Central banks (BCEAO and BFAC) and pegged to euro.  A 
survey of monetary regimes in SSA is provided by Masson and Pattillo (2005).  They 
ignore potentials trade gains and see the commitment to a common monetary policy as 
potentially strengthening domestic fiscal frameworks and, in so doing, reducing fiscal, 
as well as monetary (interest and exchange rate) autonomy and ability to respond to 
‘shocks’!  Gains for the ‘core’ countries may be offset by losses by the ‘periphery’, 
and the ‘core’ may anyway not need a currency or monetary union to condition fiscal 
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policy. IMF Country Report No.12/59 (2012) covers discussions with the regional 
institutions of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).  It is 
noted that: existing trade between the potential members of the monetary union is not 
substantial; the financial sectors lack depth and, in particular, interbank, domestic 
government and corporate bond markets are under developed.  This leads to ‘original 
sin’ (Eichergreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2003) in the form of heavy reliance for 
government funding on foreign currency denominated bond issuance; exposing the 
member country to foreign exchange funding risks.  The lack of financial sector depth, 
however, makes development of domestic debt financing extremely difficult in 
countries that have underdeveloped capital markets and are thus heavily ‘bank 
dependent’ (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) for external finance, but nevertheless have 
relatively low levels of financial intermediation.  The IMF report contains an 
Appendix (Appendix II, pp 41-48 by Hervé Joly) that draws lessons from the Euro 
Area Crisis for the WAEMU, to which we return below. 
Such  reports tend to stress that financial intermediation, interbank and capital markets 
are underdeveloped and inter-country trade of potential members of the of the unions 
is relatively small, and hence trade enhancement effects of a currency union might not 
be large, at least initially.  Additionally, the proposed currency and monetary unions 
include both large and relatively more advanced countries and small lesser developed 
countries, creating a strong potentiality of strong core groups and a weaker periphery 
groups within the currency, and proposed monetary, unions.  This raises the issue of 
whether some potential members will require a period of convergence on the ‘core’ 
countries in terms of rates of growth, levels of inflation and unemployment, and 
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interest rates and exchange rate levels and stability; and probably also, in light of the 
Eurozone Crisis, tax structures and welfare state (health, education and pension 
provision and unemployment insurance) provisions, for which no convergence criteria 
were set by the EU. Differences between countries also arise from the differing 
importance of commodity production and exports to their economies. 
In terms of the conditions necessary for successful participation in a currency union, it 
is initially advisable to test whether the countries share common definitions of money.  
This can be done using ‘weak seperability’ testing of monetary aggregates and their 
components within each of the potential member countries, Binner et al (2011) have 
done for the ASEAN countries plus Taiwan.  Essentially, the test is for the 
compatibility of the monetary and, given the role of banks in creating money (Werner 
et al, 2011) thus the banking systems of the potential members. 
Next, the extent to which the group of potential member countries deviates from the 
conditions for an Optimal Currency Area (OCA) (Mundell, 1961), should be assessed.  
These essentially require free movement of capital, and ideally also labour, between 
the members, as well as a free trade agreement.  Beyond that, the countries should not 
be expected to react significantly differently to internal and external ‘shocks’.  The 
conditions are rarely met within existing currency unions in countries such as the UK, 
the US, Germany and Australia (Fraser, MacDonald and Mullineux, 2011) and so 
countries seeking to participate in a currency union should weigh the costs (loss 
monetary and fiscal autonomy and ability to devalue or revalue the exchange rate) 
against the benefits (trade enhancement, lower and more stable inflation, and higher 
and potentially more stable growth).  A currency union consisting of a mix of net 
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exporting producers of various commodities as well as net importers, in a world where 
commodity prices are subject to large fluctuations, can anticipate big external 
commodity price ‘shocks’. 
The Eurozone started as a currency union formed by a sub group of EU member states 
adopting  a common currency (the euro) and a system of national central banks along 
with a European Central Bank (ECB) through which a policy committee sets short 
term interest rates in order to hit an inflation target (less than, but close to, 2%). In 
2013/4 it began evolving into a monetary union by vesting supervisory responsibility 
for larger and cross border banks in the ECB with effect from 1st April 2014. 
Membership of the Eurozone is based on achieving convergence criteria, as discussed 
in the first part of the paper, prior to joining, although in the case of Greece, the rules 
were not strictly applied and this had destabilising consequences.  The criteria did not 
include convergence of tax and welfare systems and there was little provision for 
fiscal transfers from better performing countries, such as Germany and other ‘core’ 
member countries, to less well performing member countries.  Further, the central EU 
budget is too small to effect significant regional transfers.  More successful monetary 
unions, such as the Australian Commonwealth, provide for such transfers (Fraser, 
MacDonald and Mullineux, 2013). 
To progress from a currency union to a full monetary union, considerable fiscal 
harmonisation (of taxes and probably also welfare provision) is required and fiscal 
transfers need to be provided for, possibly via a larger central budget and an expanded 
development bank (in the EU’s case, the European Investment Bank).  In addition, to 
underpin the monetary union, a banking union is required to provide common bank 
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supervision, and ideally also, common deposit insurance and bank resolution regimes 
(Beck, 2012; Schoenmaker and Gros, 2012: and Wihlborg, 2012) with procedures for 
resolving cross-border bank failures through risk sharing agreements.  As discussed in 
Eurozone context, the need for fiscal and banking unions with transfers between 
states, modelled on the federal systems of the US, and Germany, Canada and 
Australia, inter alia, to transform a fragile currency union into fully fledged credible 
and resilient monetary union, has been revealed by the Eurozone Crisis.  In short, a 
stable monetary union has to be underpinned by a political union that can contain and 
share the impacts of internal and external shocks.  
In addition, those that believed that Eurozone membership would force convergence 
were proved to be mistaken because the periphery countries were able to avail 
themselves of cheaper credit than they would otherwise have had access to and thus 
did not face binding, or ‘hard’, government budget constraints.  With hindsight, more 
fiscal and political, as well as economic and financial sector, convergence was 
required prior to the formation of a trade enhancing currency union.  To assure 
stability and resilience, a full banking union is also required to convert the fragile 
currency union into a robust monetary union. 
In the cases of the proposed currency unions in SSA, the microeconomic pre- 
conditions of financial sector and monetary compatibility (Binner et al, 2011) may 
well be absent and the countries considering participation are unlikely to be optimal 
currency areas in the sense of Mundell (1961), whilst trade gains, at least initially, are 
judged unlikely to be large.  Potential members must carefully weigh the short term 
and long term costs and as well as the benefits.  Potentially peripheral countries 
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should probably be persuaded to bide their time whilst they converge on core 
countries, and provisions should to be put in for the development of banking and 
political unions. 
Options vary from currency unions based essentially on a ‘currency boards’, such as 
Hong Kong and the CFA zones, to enhanced fixed exchange rate regimes, such as 
ERM 2, to arrangements for a central bank to be established to issue a common 
currency; in which case arrangements for sharing ‘seigniorage’ need to negotiated, as 
they have been in the Eurozone.  The initial Eurozone group of countries essentially 
replaced the increasingly dominant Deutschmark with the euro, increasing the 
influence of member states other than Germany over monetary policy determination 
and allowing their governments a larger share of the seigniorage ‘revenue’.  Given the 
post-war momentum the formation of the EU had built, this was agreed without too 
much difficulty by a sub-group of the EU (excluding the UK inter alia). 
The Eurozone crisis has however revealed a problem with the arrangements under 
which the national central banks of the Eurozone member countries develop credits 
and liabilities to each other under the TARGET2 interbank payments system.  The 
causes and implications of these real time exposures is a topic that is hotly debated. 
Cecchetti, McCauley and McGuire (2012) and  Buiter and Rahbari (2012) take 
strongly contrasting positions over whether the causes of the imbalances are 
predominantly due to trade or capital flows and the extent to which they reflect 
‘capital flight’ from the periphery. To the extent that the imbalances involve de facto 
burden sharing by the core with the periphery, and potential large transfers in the case 
of the central banks of the periphery debtor countries imposing losses on the German 
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central bank (the Bundesbank) and other Northern European creditor banks, they 
involve actual or potential fiscal transfers via the monetary system.  These might be 
better and more transparently dealt with by actual fiscal transfers and through 
development bank lending.   
This is a complex problem perhaps best resolved at the outset of a union whilst 
considering the fiscal implications of the sharing of seigniorage derived from the 
issuance of a common currency.  Indeed seigniorage might be hypothecated, perhaps 
along with the revenues from a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) and/or a Value 
Added Tax (VAT) on sales of financial products and services, as a means of funding 
deposit insurance and financial system oversight and capitalising a development bank 
for the union..  In addition, the complexity caused by creating a system of central 
banks clustered around a common currency issuing central bank, could be avoided if 
political agreement allowed former national central banks to be closed down.  Larger 
unions might however require regional reserve banks organised on a geographic, 
rather than a state or national basis, as in the US Federal Reserve System. 
A key question is thus, what is the currency, or monetary, union supposed to achieve?  
For potential participating member countries, the question should be asked: will the 
benefits of membership outweigh the costs after a period of adjustment acceptable to 
the electorate?   
Let us now consider what lessons Hervé Joly (IMF, 2012, Appendix II, pp 41-48) 
drew from the Eurozone crisis for the governance and stability of monetary unions in 
general, and for the WAEMU, which has developed a ‘single market’ for traded goods 
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and services, in particular.  A major difference, is that the Eurozone issues its own 
currency (the euro), whilst the WAEMU issues a currency pegged to the euro with 
guaranteed access to foreign exchange, and thus has characteristics of a currency 
board, such as Hong Kong.  The WAEMU is, however, also much less integrated 
economically and financially than the Eurozone and less connected with the global 
financial markets.  However, WAEMU has more highly developed regional regulation 
and supervision of the financial system, than the Eurozone to date.  In light of these 
similarities and differences between the two unions, the lesson for WAEMU drawn by 
Hervé Joly is that market flexibilities and regional integration facilitate adjustment to 
asymmetric shocks; fiscal discipline is essential; structural reforms must be 
undertaken to assure competitiveness; regional economic and financial surveillance 
should be strengthened; and a crisis management system should be established.   
The review of what went wrong in the Eurozone suggests that monitoring to detect the 
emergence of systemic financial instability and the development of macro-prudential 
tools, operated by the central bank, to complement micro-prudential regulation and 
supervision, will be required; along with the implementation of structural reform 
aimed at raising productivity and developing the financial sector.  Financial sector 
development, particularly of interbank markets, is a natural role for a central bank; 
whilst a development bank might be better placed to lead capital market development.  
The productivity enhancing structural reforms would need to be led by potential 
finance and economy ministries, and so international coordination of policies will be 
required until common ministries are developed in a political union. 
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With regard to financial sector regulation and supervision, there may be a case for 
retaining local regulation and supervision of local commercial and savings banks, in 
contrast to cross border international commercial and investment banks.   
Finally, even with fiscal transfers between member countries, external imbalances and 
competitiveness will need to be managed in currency or monetary unions operating as 
quasi-currency boards with pegged exchange rates, as in the case of WAEMU.  This is 
much less of an issue for the Eurozone, given that the euro has been allowed to float 
freely against the US dollar and the Japanese Yen, inter alia, in the absence of the 
capital controls (except temporarily to combat aggressive ‘shorting’ and following the 
Cyprus ‘bail-in’ of creditors in March/April 2013).  This has freed the ECB to set 
interest rates with the prime objective of hitting its inflation target.  The central bank 
in a currency board has to target the exchange rate primarily, but may gain a degree of 
freedom by imposing capital controls, especially on capital inflows.  However, such 
controls have proved hard to sustain in the medium to long term, as indeed have 
currency boards when the credibility of the pegged exchange rate is called into 
question, as in Argentina in 2000.   
In contrast, the Hong Kong currency board has maintained a fixed rate since 1984.  A 
small country with a sophisticated financial system may thus find stability easier to 
achieve than a union of countries with much less advanced financial systems.  
Commitment to a monetary union with limited fiscal transfers requires a willingness 
to undertake painful ‘internal devaluations’; as demonstrated by Germany after its ‘re-
unification’ and by the Baltic states, as they strived to meet the convergence criteria 
before joining the Eurozone. Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain are now learning this 
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lesson too.  External devaluations, or depreciations, of the common currency can help 
reduce the bloc’s trade deficit, but only if real wages are cut as a result of import price 
increases and not offset by compensating inflationary nominal wage increases 
(Sargan, 1964). Internal devaluations that reduces unit labour costs tend to be 
politically more difficult to engineer, but are the only option in a currency or monetary 
union.  In sum, entering into a currency, or a deeper monetary union, requires political 
commitment and the support of the electorates of the participating countries.  The 
Eurozone member states have been criticised for not raising their electorates’ 
awareness of the implications of the ‘journey’ towards achieving currency, and 
eventually monetary, and thus banking, fiscal and political, unions.  Instead, the 
political and intellectual elites forged ahead, leading to a ‘democratic deficit’, the 
political consequences of which threated in 2010-2012 to undermine the Eurozone 
currency union before a fully-fledged monetary union could be achieved.  Without 
further substantial progress, the Eurozone ‘core’ countries, especially the Northern 
European ones, might ultimately choose to form a monetary union that excludes the 
current periphery countries! 
7. Conclusions 
Since Mario Draghi’s promise in late July 2012 to do “whatever it takes” to preserve 
the euro, the Eurozone crisis has abated, banks have been recapitalising and the 
‘Doom Loop’ has turned into a virtuous circle as falling government bond rates have 
generated own currency capital gains for banks holdings of domestic government 
bonds, which have continued to increase. Meanwhile the perceived improvement in 
banks’ balance sheets had reduced the risk of imminent further government bail outs, 
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in turn reducing implicit government liabilities and re-enforcing their credit 
worthiness. Ireland, in December 2013, and then Portugal, in May 2014, both 
successfully ‘exited’ from their Troika rescue packages, both eschewing the option of 
continued ‘safety net’ support. Further, Spain managed to avoid a bail-out and 
returned to growth in 2013/4. Greece’s debts remain burdensome and some further 
debt forgiveness and/or debt rescheduling may still be required and Cyprus was 
already was showing signs of resilience in mid-2014 following its Spring 2013 bail-
out. Newly elected Prime ministers in Italy and France began pushing back in 2014 
against the  strict (‘German’) interpretation of the 2102 Fiscal Compact, promising 
accelerated structural reform to stimulate deficit reducing economic growth in return 
for being allowed more time to achieve fiscal consolidation. 
Fragmentation in the ‘single’ financial market remained a problem; especially for 
SMEs seeking affordable bank loans in peripheral countries. The 2013 GdRE MBF 
conference panel in Poitiers considered the topic: “Restoring the Bank Lending 
Channel”. It concluded that much more needed to be done to stimulate affordable 
bank lending to SMEs in the EU (Mullineux, 2013b). Just as Mario Draghi, the ECB 
President, seemingly responded to the recommendations of the June 2012 GdRE 
conference panel by promptly promising in July 2012 to do “whatever it takes” to save 
the euro, so he responded with a package of measures in June 2014, howbeit much 
more belatedly, to the recommendations of the 2013 GdRE conference panel; this time 
just ahead of the next GdRE MBF conference panel held in June 2014 in Lyons! 
The ECB’s June 2014 package borrowed from the UK’s ‘Funding for Lending 
Scheme’ (FLS) operated by HM Treasury and the Bank of England which began in 
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August 2012 to offer cheap loans of up to four years to banks and building societies 
that expanded their mortgage and SME lending. With the housing market stimulus 
focussing instead on an alternative ‘Help to Buy’ scheme introduced in 2013 to help 
first time buyers and subsequently extended to incorporate mortgage loan guarantees, 
the FLS was re-focussed entirely on lending to SMEs at the end of its initial 18 month 
window in early 2014. The FLS has not succeeded in stimulating a substantial 
increase in lending to SMEs in the UK, but nevertheless the ECB is to implement a 
‘Targeted LTRO’ (TLTRO) scheme that provides increased access to cheap financing 
for lending to SMEs. To back this up, the ECB is exploring the possibility of 
purchasing SME-loan backed securities in the future to further stimulate the SME 
lending market. It is hoped that TLTRO will prove particularly beneficial to SME 
borrowers in periphery countries, thereby both ameliorating fragmentation and 
stimulating economic growth. 
Below target inflation, and potential deflation, particularly in periphery countries, 
became an increasing cause for concern in the Eurozone in 2013/4, and with this in 
mind, the ECB also introduced negative interest rates on bank deposits with it in order 
to discourage banks from simply depositing their LTRO borrowings with it. A large 
portion of LTRO borrowing has hitherto been invested instead in domestic 
government bonds, although many banks have been repaying their LTRO borrowings 
ahead of the ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment in the second half of 2014. The 
TLTRO scheme aims to encourage lending by banks to SMEs, rather than any further 
domestic government bond purchases, whose weight in bank portfolios has been 
further increased as a result of banks deleveraging through sales of their more risky 
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assets to improve their capital ratios ahead of the Comprehensive Assessment. 
Throughout the crisis the euro exchange rate against the US Dollar and the yen 
remained surprisingly strong, although some weakening against the US Dollar helped 
stimulate recovery in the periphery, and particularly Spain, and as the crisis has 
abated, it has strengthened further, adding to disinflationary pressures. As the Bank of 
England and the US Fed increasingly contemplate raising interest rates towards more 
normal levels, the euro might be expected to depreciate. If not, the ECB may yet have 
to adopt Quantitative Easing involving direct purchases of government bond issuance, 
despite the German Bundesbank’s increasingly muted objections, in order to nudge 
the euro lower and raise inflation to nearer to the 2% target levels; which it was well 
below (closer to 1%) in mid-2014.  
But, just when investors in bank shares thought it was safe to go back into the water 
amid a widespread and longstanding stock market ‘bull-run’, Banco Espírito Santo, 
Portugal’s largest bank, ran into trouble in mid July 2014, causing widespread falls in 
European stock markets, particularly in periphery countries. Would the Portuguese 
government have to use the reserves it had so painfully built up before exiting the 
Troika agreement, or would the bank’s creditors be bailed-in, or some combination of 
the two? The EU’s BRRD does not come into effect until the end of 2015, so the EU’s 
nascent banking union is nowhere near fully operative. The Eurozone clearly remains 
susceptible to shocks and, with Italy and France pushing back on the 2012 Fiscal 
Compact, a full fiscal and political union is far from secure. With its given powers, the 
ECB may try to do “whatever it takes”, but that may ultimately not be enough unless 
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the Eurozone’s evolution from a potentially fragile currency union to a fully-fledged 
resilient monetary union can be credibly progressed soon enough. 
Countries in SSA should draw the lesson that forming a monetary union is not just an 
economic trade enhancing venture, but a major political agenda that is not to be 
entered into lightly. Currency unions may potentially enhance free trade agreements, 
but will be fragile unless backed by banking, fiscal and political unions to transform 
them to resilient monetary unions. This is especially true when, as seems most likely, 
the participating countries do not naturally meet the conditions for an optimal 
currency area. Potentially peripheral, often smaller, countries would be wise to pursue 
banking and financial sector, monetary, fiscal, economic and political convergence 
whilst using some mechanism to peg their currencies to the currency, or a basket of 
currencies, of the likely core country, or countries. 
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